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Managerial views on compulsory unionism 
in New Zealand 
A J Geare* 
The New Zealand industrial relations literature contains a number of propositions 
concerning the impact or desirability of having compulsory union membership. This 
paper discusses the propositions, and reports on the response of a sample of 461 New 
Zealand managers, examining the significance of their attitudes. 
Introduction 
Compulsory unionism, either by statute or by agreement, has played a significant role 
in New Zealand industrial relations for over half a century. At various stages the views 
of the New Zealand Employers' Federation (NZEF) on compulsory unionism have been 
made known. (The NZEF was anti in 1936, but had swung completely to be pro in 
1951, 1961, and the 1970's. It had a second swing to again be anti in 1984). However, 
the views of New Zealand managers have not received much publicity. This paper 
attempts to redress the problem and is an examination of managerial, as opposed to 
NZEF, views on compulsory unionism. 
Given the number of accounts already in the literature (Szakats, 1972; Howells, 1983; 
Geare, 1984) most readers will be familiar with New Zealand's experience with 
compulsory unionism. However it should be noted that from 1936-1961 there was 
compulsory unionism by law; from 1961-1984 and 1985-present, compulsory unionism 
"by agreement" (union-management) or, failing that, by majority vote of the workforce. 
From 1984-5, there was a brief period of voluntary unionism, by law. 
This paper examines 7 of the more common propositions in the literature concerning 
compulsory unionism and discusses the attitudes of a sample of 461 New Zealand 
managers to those propositions. It also gives the attitudes to the general questions as to 
whether compulsory unionism should be encouraged, tolerated or discouraged. 
Method 
The research study replicates an earlier study undertaken in Australia. It involved 
sending a multi-faceted questionnaire to 995 managers throughout New Zealand. The 
managers had been selected by name and position from the New Zealand Business Who's 
Who 1984-5 using systematic sampling to give a spread of position, seniority and 
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organisation size (minimum of 20 employees) and to ensure that only managers, as 
opposed to non-executive directors, were selected. A total of 506 responses were 
obtained, of which 461 (46.3 percent of the original sample) were useable. In this way, 
information from a cross section of managers was obtained. A brief description of the 
sample is given below in Table 1. 
Table 1: Description of sample (N = 461) 
Job level Boord Senior/Staff Middle 
% 23.2 69.6 7.2 
Function General Mgt. Personnel/I.R Other 
% 64.9 16.3 18.9 
Size ofOrg >20<100 <500 <1,000 <5,000 >5,000 
% 33.6 31.9 12.8 15.2 6.5 
Size of Plant >20<100 <500 >500 
% 63.8 30.4 5.9 
Gendcr Male Female Not Given 
% 99.3 0.2 0.4 
Plant has 
dealings with No Yes 
Unions % 15.4 84.6 
In this aspect of the study, respondents answered the questions on a 7-point Likert-
type scale indicating from strongly disagree to strongly agree their response to 7 
propositions regarding compulsory unionism discussed below. In addition they responded 
to questions as to whether they considered compulsory unionism: 
(a) should be encouraged; 
(b) should be discouraged; 
(c) should be neither encouraged nor discouraged- but tolerated if it occurs. 
Propositions concerning compulsory unionism 
The issue of compulsory unionism has often aroused emotional and unthinking 
reactions. Such matters "have traditionally been regarded as a controversial subject 
and ... still generate a lot of heat" (Cordova and Ozaki, 1980, p.19). A further difficulty in 
having rational arguments on the desirability or impact of compulsory unionism is that 
the issue is so dependent on value judgements and the frame of reference of the particular 
observer. Hence different people will argue not only about the truth or otherwise of a 
statement, but even if in agreement about the truth, may disagree as to the consequences. 
For example, one proposition is that compulsory unionism reduces union militancy. It 
is quite possible to either accept or reject the proposition as a matter of fact. If it is 
accepted, this may be perceived as an argument for compulsory unionism (if the person 
opposes militancy), or against (if the person favours a militant approach). 
As stated above, the paper examines 7 propositions that are supported in the literature 
and discusses the degree of logic behind each one. The degree of managerial support for 
these propositions will be presented and discussed. The propositions are that compulsory 
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unionism, (through what was known as "unqualified preference" and is now known as the 
"union memberships clause"): 
( 1) will reduce union militancy 
This viewpoint has been argued at around the time of a number of the significant periods 
in New Zealand's history of compulsory unionism - 1936, 1961 and 1976. There are 
three aspects to the argument. The first is that most unions should become at least 
somewhat less militant in that the impact of the militant members becomes lowered by 
the numbers of apathetic unionists, forced to become members because of the 
compulsion. Thus a quarterly journal, the Round Table, stated in September 1937 that 
compulsory unionists "tend rather to "dilute" the militants and so to accentuate the 
tendency for union~ to co.nc~rn .~emselves primarily with problems of hours and wage 
rates rath~r .than with sociahsm (Roth, 1973, p.58). This line of argument, in contrast 
to propositiOn. (2) below, assumes that a union's strength lies in the proportion of 
strongly committed members, rather than in its size or wealth. 
The second aspect is that central union organisations are less militant under 
compulsory union membership, since the influence of unions on the policy stance of the 
central organisation depends on their size, and traditionally non-militant unions such as 
cl~ric~ unions and ~h.op assi~tants gain relatively far more members under compulsory 
umomsm than do m~h~t umons. ~ood~ (1975), observes that when it was suggested 
that compulsory umomsm be abohshed m 1961, it was the non-militant unions who 
were the most concerned, because not only would their memberships be drastically cut 
but t~eir "vo~ng strength in Federation. of Labour conferences ... would be equally 
drastically cut (p.32). Woods further pomts out that the NZEF also realised that the 
propos~l for volun~y un~on~sm "~ould radically alter the balance of power in the 
Federation of Labour . This viewpomt of the NZEF remained into the 1970's and when 
~he National Opposition stated that if they were returned to power in 1975 they would 
mtroduce voluntary unionism, that policy was again attacked. Harbridge and Walsh 
(1985) report. th~t "The New Zealand Employers Federation warned that any move towards 
voluntary umomsm would strengthen militant unions at the expense of moderate unions 
and its pre~ident acidly dismissed the proposal as nonsense" (p.195). ' 
The third aspect is that union militancy is often a result of having to demonstrate 
their "effectiveness" by taking aggressive action to attract and retain members. Hanson et 
al._(19~2) discusses this J?Oint ~d "the view that th~ closed shop encourages 'responsible' 
umons (p.13). The rationale Is, that by not havmg membership worries, unions can 
take a longer term, more "mature" viewpoint. 
(2) will strengthen the union movement through increased membership 
Hare (1946) although in general critical of compulsory unionism, acknowledged its 
strengthening effects, pointing out that 
It ~as resulted ~ a great s~en.gthe~ng of the existing unions, increasing both 
therr membership and therr fmanctal strength ... and it has at the same time 
resulted in the unionisation of many small groups of workers who were 
previously unorganised (p.l80). 
!Jare further poin_ts ~ut that compulsory unionism also resulted in a stable, long 
lastm~ c~ntral orgamsat10n. - the Federation of Labour. Compared to the previous 
orgamsatt~ns th~. Federation marked "a great advance in stability, power and 
re~re~nta~veness (p.187). Geare (1988) has illustrated the dramatic effect compulsory 
umomsm m New Zealand had both on overall union membership growth from 1935-
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1937 (up 188%) and more particularly on specific unions (such as, shop assistants up 
358%). 
Thus, in contrast to the previous proposition, this one assumes that strength 
basically comes from membership size resulting in increased financial strength (from 
union dues), and in some circumstances strength is reflected in voting strength on central 
organisations. Woods (1963) reports that among union members themselves, an 
important minority hold: 
to the view that compulsory membership saps the initiative and the real 
strength and solidarity of a trade union by the inclusion of lukewarm, apathetic, 
and even unsympathetic members (p.131). 
(3) will reduce conflict within the workforce 
This proposition argues that compulsory unionism reduces intra-workforce conflict, 
in that union members no longer resent non-members who are seen as "free-riders". Roth 
(1973) reports an account by the secretary of the Hotel Workers' Association, who asserts 
that before the introduction of compulsory unionism non-members were subjected to "a 
mild form of coercion and intimidation" to force them to join, or else "conditions ... were 
made so difficult on the job that a non-unionist would not stay"(p.124). There is a 
logical relationship between this proposition and the first - the conflict created by the 
non-unionists should tend to make unions more militant. 
A counter to this proposition could be made that during the brief period of voluntary 
unionism from 1984-1985 there was relatively little industrial disruption. The then 
Director of the NZEF stated "The country has now had the experience of voluntary 
unionism ... there has not been industrial mayhem" (Campbell, 1984, p.19). However, 
just after voluntary unionism was introduced in 1984, the point was made (Geare, 1984) 
that little union action should rationally be anticipated - because an election was 
forthcoming which Labour had an excellent chance of winning. If re-elected, Labour was 
certain to revoke the legislation. Any violent action during the run-up to the election 
would only hurt Labour and favour National. 
( 4) is an unwa"anted infringement on human freedom 
This argument is probably the most emotive concerning compulsory unionism. In a 
simplistic sense it is true that any compulsion infringes freedom. However, this is not a 
simple world. As argued below, preventing compulsory unionism also infringes 
freedom. The issue here is whether the infringement is unwarranted or not, bearing in 
mind the advantages that may accrue from compulsory unionism, and the escape valve for 
individuals with genuine convictions to be granted conscientious objector status. 
The literature on New Zealand industrial relations has many examples of this 
proposition being discussed as one argument against compulsory unionism (including 
Szakats, 1972; Roth, 1973; Howells, 1983; and Harbridge and Walsh, 1985) but less 
from those arguing the point out of conviction. An exception is the paper by the current 
leader of the Opposition who, when Minister of Labour, strongly argued that compulsory 
unionism "is a clear infringement on personal freedom" (Bolger, 1983, p.24). 
Outside the academic literature, this is the most usual argument put up by those who 
oppose compulsory unionism. Usually it is done in a way that implies that rejection of 
this point of view indicates a lack of concern for "freedom of the individual". Thus, when 
asked why the NZEF had seemingly discovered "individual freedom" after ignoring it for 
20 years the then Director replied: 
We changed our views. We decided that individual rights had been forgotten for 
too long in New Zealand. It is fundamentally objectionable for assessors to sit 
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no say in electing them. Fundamentally objectionable (Campbell, 1985, 
p.19). 
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There is an interesting observation by Paul Roots (1986), Director of Industrial 
Relations for Ford (UK), which refers to the British semi-equivalent of the Employers 
Federation- the CBI (Confederation of British Industry). He states: 
The rhetoric of the CBI is also at variance with the views of individual 
employers. The further one goes from the shopfloor, the more strident become 
criticisms of the closed shop in terms of a denial of individual liberty. 
Individual liberty is an upper-class concept. Working people have to get up 
early, accept shift work, and do as they are told by employers. They have very 
little freedom, and in their environment the concept of individual liberty has 
very little meaning. Politicians need to realise the realities of the shopfloor if 
they are to make the law relevant to industrial relations (p.2). 
The above quote hints at the hypocrisy with which some proponents argue for 
freedom with regards to compulsory union membership, while supporting a lack of 
freedom in many other work and life activities. Further, it should be noted that a denial 
of compulsory unionism also denies committed unionists the right not to have to work 
with free-riders. The issue is thus one of assessing conflicting freedoms and their relative 
importance in a situation of many restrictions on freedom. It is not, whatever the 
propaganda, a question of being simply for or against human freedom. 
(5) results in unions not bothering to provide good service for their members 
The basic rationale for this argument is that under voluntary unionism "unions will 
have to operate in a manner which will persuade workers to join their organisation" 
(Bolger, 1983, p.23), and that they will do so by providing "good service", rather than 
resorting to coercion. While some may argue that under voluntary unionism the "good 
service" will be benefits - wages, conditions, union holiday houses, union educational 
scholarships etc.- others have different interpretations. Hare (1946) considers that under 
compulsory unionism -
The spirit of a crusade for social progress which used to actuate the great majority 
of union secretaries has now often given place to a complacent acceptance of the 
situation in which the organisation will maintain itself (pp. 198-9). 
Hare condemns professional union secretaries, as he feels they -
...have developed a vested interest in social discord, and have no aim other than 
to maintain their power by getting for the members of their union higher pay, 
shorter hours, and better conditions. Unless these aims are coupled with a 
sincere desire for social progress and a constant endeavour to educate the 
members of a union to take their place in industry as responsible citizens, they 
become artificial sources of social conflict, because they carry with them no 
genuine desire for a remedy (p.199). 
Hare's views are worth quoting as they illustrate the subjective and idiosyncratic 
nature of many arguments concerning compulsory unionism. This writer believes that the 
vast majority of workers would be more inclined to rate the attainment of "higher pay, 
shorter hours and better conditions" rather than the pursuit of "social progress", as "good 
service". 
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(6) makes management negotiations more useful since the union represents all workers 
This proposition is frequently supported as being factually accurate. Thus Douglas 
(1983), now President of the Council of Trade Unions, wrote that the fact that clauses 
supporting compulsory unionism were inserted in awards and agreements -
signifies that employers and workers representatives all desire its inclusion. 
For the employers this may be either a recognition of the stability which results 
from one organisation covering all workers and/or the realisation that the 
overwhelming proportion of union members support its inclusion (p.31). 
One would suppose that pragmatic managers would tend to agree, both with this and 
with the third proposition. 
(7) legitimately upholds the principle of "user pays" 
This proposition is frequently put by unionists and is the most common argument in 
favour of compulsory unionism. The rationale is clear-cut-
to accept the advantages and rights achieved by their (the unions) struggle 
without being a member and contributing to the funds is unfair; thus freedom not 
to join a union is freedom from paying union subscriptions ... to take a free ride 
on the backs of one's fellow worker (Szakats, 1972, p.327). 
Harbridge and Webber (1987) point out that this user pays principle was supported by 
the Labour Government in its 1984 election manifesto saying it would support what was 
in effect compulsory unionism, recognizing that "those who gain should contribute to the 
cost of that gain" (p.81). In order to test managerial attitudes, the proposition was 
deliberately framed to state that it "legitimately" upheld user pays. 
Results 
The numbers and percentages of managers who agreed or disagreed with the 7 
propositions concerning the impact of compulsory unionism together with their views as 
to what should be done about compulsory unionism are given in Table 2 below. To 
simplify the presentation, categories have been collapsed to indicate those who strongly 
disagree (1,2(7), are neutral (3,4,5/7) or who strongly agree (6,7(7). · 
With regard to the mean responses, there was strong agreement for propositions 4 and 
5 - that compulsory unionism is an unwarranted infringement on human freedom, and 
that it results in unions not giving good services. There was strong disagreement with 
propositions 1 and 3 - that it reduces militancy, and that it reduces conflict within the 
workforce. In effect, therefore, the managers agreed with propositions which were 
basically anti-compulsory unionism, and disagreed with those that, from a managerial 
viewpoint, would be most favourable to compulsory unionism. The average responses to 
the other three propositions were much less definite. 
With these overall negative attitudes to compulsory unionism, the responses to the 
final questions were predictable. There was strong agreement that compulsory unionism 
should be discouraged and strong disagreement that it be encouraged. Not surprisingly, 
tests revealed a high negative correlation (-.89) between these responses. There was a 
very weak negative response to the proposal that compulsory unionism be tolerated when 
it occurs. 
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Table 2: Attitudes and beliefs towards compulsory unionism (N=461) 
Compulsory unionism (through the "closed shop"): 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1-2) 
1) reduces union militancy 67 
*mean= 2.56 
2) strengthens the union movement 27 
through increased membership *mean= 4.48 
3) reduces conflict with the workforce 53 
*mean= 3.02 
4) is an unwarranted infringement on 13 
human freedom *mean = 5.49 
5) results in unions not bothering to 13 
provide good service for their members *mean= 5.16 
6) makes management -union negotiations more 33 
useful since the union represents all workers *mean= 3.86 
7) legitimately upholds the principle of 38 
"user pays" *mean = 3.45 
8) should be encouraged 
9) should be discouraged 
10) should be neither encouraged nor 
discouraged - but tolerated if it 
occurs 
* calculated on total figures, not collapsed 
Discussion 
63 
*mean= 2.56 
17 
*mean= 5.24 
36 
*mean= 3.52 
(3-5) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(6-7) 
19 14 
S.d.= 1.87 
28 44 
S.d.= 2.16 
31 16 
S.d.= 1.87 
20 67 
S.d.= 1.93 
31 57 
S.d.= 1.84 
40 27 
S.d.= 1.97 
45 18 
S.d.= 1.82 
24 13 
S.d.= 1.89 
24 60 
S.d.= 2.04 
45 19 
S.d.= 1.93 
There are a number of issues which need to be explored with respect to the above 
results. The issues are the extent to which: 
(1) managerial attitudes are consistent with regards the propositions; 
(2) demographic variables can explain differences in attitudes; 
(3) the timing of the data collection affects the results. 
238 A J Geare 
Managerial consistency 
The attitude scores for the 461 managers for the 7 propositions and the three "overall" 
questions were correlated. The results showed that 6 of the 7 propositions and the two 
general questions as to whether compulsory unionism be encouraged or discouraged inter-
correlated to a reasonable degree. Most correlation coefficients were in the order of 0.2 to 
0.5. Although these are all statistically highly significant (0.18 is significant at .001), 
only one correlation coefficient was very high - that between the two general questions 
which was 0.89. The level of correlation indicates a degree of consistency, but not a 
startlingly high level. 
The proposition which did not inter-correlate was the second one (that compulsory 
unionism strengthens the union movement through increased membership), along with 
the third general question (that compulsory unionism be tolerated if it occurs). 
Proposition 2 may be a maverick in that some managers could have had difficulty 
clarifying what the implications were in agreeing or disagreeing. Agreement with some 
of the propositions (1, 3, 6 and 7) clearly indicates a favourable attitude to compulsory 
unionism. Agreement with others (4 and 5) clearly indicates an unfavourable attitude. 
However, agreement with proposition 2 does not necessarily indicate either a favourable 
or an unfavourable attitude. 
Demographic variables 
Statistical tests were performed on the data to determine whether any demographic 
variable could explain differences in attitudes. It was anticipated that one variable would 
produce significant results- namely whether the manager was (a) a personnel/industrial 
relations manager, (b) in another functional area or (c) was in general management. The 
rationale was that industrial relations managers, although equally subject to media 
propaganda, would be more pragmatic, aware of the advantages to managers of 
compulsory unionism and hence more supportive. However, simple statistical testing 
(chi-square) revealed no difference in attitude to the 7 propositions. Industrial relations 
managers did prove to be less extreme in their opposition to compulsory unionism in 
general, being more inclined to a neutral stance. 
Of course, the fact that one managerial group has statistically significantly different 
views, does not necessarily mean that it was the job function which was the crucial 
variable. For example, the size of organisation may explain the differences - and a higher 
percentage of personnel/industrial relations managers may work for very large 
organisations. To test this, regression analysis was performed, using all the demographic 
information as independent variables, with the responses to the view that compulsory 
unionism be encouraged as dependent. 
Stepwise selection of variables was then used to see if any one, or small number, of 
variables can explain the differences. In no case did any variable account for more than a 
small amount of variation. Thus, counter to the preconceived view of the author that 
industrial relations managers would be more pragmatic than general managers or those in 
other functions and have significantly more supportive views towards compulsory 
unionism, this proved not to be the case. Managerial attitudes appear not to be related to 
any particular variable. 
Timing of the data collection 
The data on which this paper is based were collected in 1984-5, the brief period of 
voluntary unionism. This fact in itself may affect results, although it is submitted other 
variables would have much more impact. 
Voluntary unionism was introduced by the National Government in February 1984 - a 
government with a paper thin majority and which was in danger of losing that majority 
Compulsory unionism 239 
while it was also losing public support. Hence a Labour victory later in 1984 seemed 
highly probable, if not a total certainty. The Labour Opposition made it clear it would 
revert back to compulsory unionism once it gained office. Hence, it was obvious to 
many and should have been clear to all, that the period in 1984 was "unreal". The tacit 
acceptance by unions of the measures simply reflected the knowledge that voluntary 
unionism was a temporary measure and the fact that strike action at the time would hurt 
Labour's chances. 
It is submitted that the major influence on managerial attitudes has been the effect on 
unions of the economic conditions, and also the consequences of legislative changes. 
Unions have been severely affected by the high level of unemployment, and the closely 
related threats of redundancy, which has weakened their relative power position. 
Legislative changes - affecting the registration of unions, the availability of arbitration 
and threats to the rational award system have also diverted many unions from their 
traditional stances. Coupled with this has been the attacks on the concept of compulsory 
unionism by the National Party and the NZEF. While this writer suspects the motives 
behind the attacks were political and for tactical reasons (keeping the unions diverted), 
they have also contributed both to the general propaganda, and emphasised the tactical 
advantages in continued sniping at the union movement. 
Conclusions 
This study has revealed strong feelings against compulsory unionism from a 
widespread sample of New Zealand managers. Given the universal acceptance of 
compulsory unionism from 1961 to 1984, the managers surveyed apparently see 
surprisingly few advantages. Possibly managers have always disliked the concept, but 
calculated the cost in opposing it was too high, and rationalised that even if it was not a 
"good thing", it was at least a "pragmatic" choice. 
The propositions examined in this study are clearly neither supported nor unsupported 
by the results - nor was there any attempt to do so. However the study does indicate a 
strong feeling of opposition to compulsory unionism which will probably result in 
further propaganda against the continuation of compulsory unionism through the union 
membership clause. It is unlikely however that in the short term there will be wide-scale 
opposition by management assessors to the clause's insertion - given that under current 
law this would simply result in a ballot. Experience in the 1970's indicates that ballots 
would result in retention of compulsory unionism. Hence management opposition would 
only be for the purpose of deliberate specific provocation. The more likely scenario is 
non-specific sniping at the union movement with general calls for "labour market 
flexibility" and voluntary unionism. 
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How does New Zealand compare now? 
International comparisons of disaggregated 
unemployment data 
Peter Brosnan and Moira Wilson* 
This article updates Hicks and Brosnan's 1982 study which compared disaggregated 
unemployment data for Australia, Norway, the UK and the USA with similar data from 
New Zealand. It is found that women, youth and non-white workers bear a 
disproportionate share of the unemployment burden and the unemployment burden is 
distributed more inequitably in New Zealand than in any of the other 4 countries. 
Introduction 
Seven years ago, Hicks and Brosnan (1982) conducted an analysis of disaggregated 
unemployment data. They compared New Zealand unemployment statistics with those 
for 4 countries which had some other similarities to New Zealand. They demonstrated 
that while New Zealand had comparatively low rates of unemployment, the distribution 
of unemployment in New Zealand was considerably less equitable than in the other 4 
countries. 
. The intervening period has seen changes in the international economy and profound 
changes in New Zealand. Registered unemployment in New Zealand averaged just over 
48,000 in 1981. The corresponding average for 1988 was 121,000. Whereas most 
countries experienced economic growth after the mid 1980s, New Zealand suffered serious 
economic decline. This decline and the subsequent growth in unemployment was the 
direct result of the Labour Government's policies in both the public and private sectors. 
Thousands of staff were shed from government departments where inefficiency was 
equated with the number on the payroll, while other departments were turned into State 
Owned Enterprises and their managers also attempted to achieve efficiencies by reducing 
the number employed. Similar effects occurred in sectors such as health, where reduced 
levels of government funding resulted in substantial staff cuts. 
Reduced employment in the public sector led to demand contraction in the private 
sector. Moreover, other government policies exacerbated the effect on this. The abrupt 
removal of border protection and the promotion of CER substantially reduced 
employment. Manufacturing employment fell by more than 15 percent between 
December 1985 and December 1988. There were significant second-round reductions in 
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